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Abstract. The Game Description Language (GDL) has been intro-
duced as an official language for specifying games in the AAAI General
Game Playing Competition since 2005. It was originally designed as a
declarative language for representing rules of arbitrary games with per-
fect information. More recently, an epistemic extension of GDL, called
EGDL, has been proposed for representing and reasoning about imper-
fect information games. In this paper, we develop an axiomatic system
for a variant of EGDL and prove its soundness and completeness with
respect to the semantics based on the epistemic state transition model.
With a combination of action symbols, temporal modalities and epis-
temic operators, the completeness proof requires novel combinations of
techniques used for completeness of propositional dynamic logic and epis-
temic temporal logic. We demonstrate how to use the proof theory for
inferring game properties from game rules.
1 Introduction
General Game Playing (GGP) is concerned with creating intelligent agents that
can play previously unknown games by just being given their rules [6]. To spec-
ify a game played by autonomous agents, a formal game description language,
called GDL, has been introduced as an official language for GGP since 2005.
GDL is defined as a high-level, machine-processable language for representing
the rules of arbitrary games with perfect information [16]. Originally designed
as a logic programming language, GDL has been recently adapted as a logical
language for game specification and strategic reasoning [25]. Based on this, the
epistemic extension of GDL, called EGDL, has been developed for representing
and reasoning about imperfect information games [14].
Syntactically, EGDL extends GDL with the standard epistemic operators
to specify the rules of imperfect information games and capture the epistemic
status of agents. For example, an EGDL-formula Kr(does(a) ∧ ©wins(r)) →
does(a) specifies that if an agent knows that taking an action leads to win at
the next state, then she takes that action at the current state. Semantically,
EGDL is interpreted over epistemic state transition models which are used to
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represent synchronous and deterministic games with imperfect information. The
expressive power and computational efficiency of EGDL have been investigated
in [14]. In this paper, we address the fundamental logical question of a complete
axiomatization for EGDL.
The axiomatic system for EGDL that we present is composed of axiom
schemes and inference rules that capture the logical properties of the semantical
models. With action, temporal and epistemic operators, the completeness proof
of EGDL, however, is non-trivial. It requires novel combinations and extensions
of techniques from both propositional dynamic logic (PDL) [15] and epistemic
temporal logics (ETLs) [7].
To achieve the completeness of EGDL, we first construct a pre-model for a
consistent EGDL-formula ϕ out of maximal consistent subsets of a finite set of
formulas, called the closure of ϕ. Similar to [7], we define a number of different
distinct levels of closure so as to deal with the epistemic operators. The tech-
niques to construct the pre-model has been strongly influenced by two sources
which gave us valuable insights: [15] providing an elementary proof of the com-
pleteness of PDL, and [7] presenting a general framework for completeness proofs
of ETLs. Unfortunately, the pre-model is non-deterministic and thus is not an
epistemic state transition model. To fill this gap, we then transform the pre-
model into an epistemic state transition model with an equivalent satisfiability
of EGDL-formulas. Such transformation is inspired by the method used in [18]
to transform a non-deterministic automata into a deterministic one. From the
completeness proof, we derive the finite model property for EGDL: every EGDL-
formula that is satisfiable in some epistemic state transition model is satisfiable
in a finite epistemic state transition model. We also demonstrate how to use the
proof theory for inferring game properties from game rules.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 establishes the syntax
and the semantics of EGDL. Section 3 provides a sound and complete axiomatic
system for EGDL and demonstrates how to use the proof theory for reasoning
about game rules. Section 4 discusses the related work. Finally we conclude with
future work.
2 The Framework
All games are assumed to be played in multi-agent environments. Each game is
associated with a game signature. A game signature S is a triple (N,A, Φ), where
N = {1, 2, · · · ,m} is a non-empty finite set of agents; A = ⋃r∈N Ar, where Ar
consists of a non-empty finite set of actions for agent r such that different agents
have different actions, i.e., Ar1 ∩Ar2 = ∅ if r1 = r2 and each agent has an action
without effects, i.e., noopr ∈ Ar, and Φ = {p, q, · · · } is a finite set of propositional
atoms for specifying individual features of a game state.
Through the rest of the paper, we will fix a game signature S and all concepts
will be based on this game signature unless otherwise specified.
2.1 Epistemic State Transition Models
We consider synchronous imperfect information games where all players move
simultaneously and may have partial information of the game states. The struc-
tures of these games may be specified by epistemic state transition models
defined as follows:
Definition 1. An epistemic state transition (EST) model M is a tuple
(W, I, T, {Rr}r∈N , {Lr}r∈N , U, g, π), where
– W is a non-empty set of possible states.
– I ⊆ W , representing a set of initial states.
– T ⊆ W\I, representing a set of terminal states.
– Rr ⊆ W ×W is an equivalence relation for agent r, indicating the states that
are indistinguishable for r.
– Lr ⊆ W × Ar is a legality relation for agent r, describing the legal actions
of agent r at each state. Let Lr(w) = {a ∈ Ar : (w, a) ∈ Lr} be the set of
all legal actions of agent r at state w. To make a game playable, we assume
that (i) each agent has at least one available action at each state: Lr(w) = ∅
for all r ∈ N and w ∈ W , and (ii) at all terminal states each agent can only
take action noop: Lr(w) = {noopr} for any r ∈ N and w ∈ T .
– U : W × ∏r∈N Ar ↪→ W\I is a partial update function, specifying the state
transformations, such that U(w, 〈noopr〉r∈N ) = w for any w ∈ T .
– g : N → 2W is a goal function, specifying the winning states for each agent.
– π : W → 2Φ is a standard valuation function.
Note that different from [14], (i) we consider a general case without assuming
a unique initial state; (ii) the update function is partial, as not all joint actions
are possible in all states due to the legality relation. In particular, there is no
semantical condition to guarantee that all joint legal actions lead to valid next
states. Such a condition is not easy to provide, giving the legal conditions are
defined for individual agents. Besides this, we do not require each agent knows
her own legal actions, since in GGP it may occur that an agent fails to figure out
her legal actions given the limited time. In that case, the game master assigns
a random legal action for her. For convenience, let D denote the set of all joint
actions
∏
r∈N A
r. For d ∈ D, let d(r) denote agent r’s action in the joint action
d. We write Rr(w) for the set of all states that agent r cannot distinguish from
w, i.e., Rr(w) = {u ∈ W : wRru}. We now define the notion of a path to
specify the set of all possible ways in which a game can develop.
Definition 2. Given an EST-model M = (W, I, T, {Rr}r∈N , {Lr}r∈N , U, g, π),
a path δ is an infinite sequence of states and actions w0
d1→ w1 d2→ w2 · · · dj→ · · ·
such that for all j ≥ 1 and for any r ∈ N ,
1. wj = U(wj−1, dj) (state update);
2. (wj−1, dj(r)) ∈ Lr (that is, any action that is taken must be legal);
3. if wj−1 ∈ T , then wj−1 = wj (that is, a loop after reaching a terminal state).
It follows that only the first state may be initial, i.e., wj ∈ I. Let P(M) denote
the set of all paths in M . When M is fixed, we simply write P. For a path δ ∈ P
and a position j ≥ 0, we use δ[j], δ[0, j] and δ[j,∞] to denote the j-th state
of δ, the finite prefix w0
d1→ w1 d2→ · · · dj→ wj of δ and the infinite suffix path
wj
dj+1→ wj+1 dj+2→ · · · of δ, respectively. Finally, we write θr(δ, j) for the action
of agent r taken at stage j of δ.
The following definition, by extending equivalence relations over states to
paths, characterizes precisely what an agent with imperfect recall and perfect
reasoning can in principle know during a game.
Definition 3. Two paths δ, δ′ ∈ P are imperfect recall (also called memoryless)
equivalent for agent r, written δ ≈r δ′, iff δ[0]Rrδ′[0].
That is, imperfect recall requires an agent to be only aware of the present state
but forget everything that happened. This is similar to the notion of imperfect
recall in ATL [20].
2.2 The Syntax
Let us now introduce an epistemic extension of the game description language
GDL [25] to represent games with imperfect information. We further provide a
semantics for the language based on the epistemic state transition model. In the
following, we call this resulting framework EGDL for short.
Definition 4. The language L of EGDL is generated by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | initial | terminal | legal(ar) | wins(r) | does(ar) |
¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ©ϕ | Krϕ | Cϕ
where p ∈ Φ, r ∈ N and ar ∈ Ar.
Other connectives ∨, →, ↔, , ⊥ are defined by ¬ and ∧ in the standard
way. Intuitively, initial and terminal specify the initial state and the terminal
states of a game, respectively; does(ar) asserts that agent r takes action a at the
current state; legal(ar) asserts that action a is available to agent r at the current
state; and wins(r) asserts that agent r wins at the current state. The formula
©ϕ means “ϕ holds in the next state”. All these components are inherited from
GDL. The epistemic operators K and C are taken from the Modal Epistemic
Logic [5,9]. The formula Krϕ is read as “agent r knows ϕ”, and Cϕ as “ϕ is
common knowledge among all the agents in N”. As usual, we write K̂r for the
dual of Kr and Eϕ for
∧
r∈N Krϕ, saying that every agent in N knows ϕ.
To illustrate the intuition of the language, let us consider a variant of the
Tic-Tac-Toe, called Krieg-Tictactoe in [19].
Example 1. Krieg-Tictactoe is played by two players, cross x and naught o, who
take turns marking cells in a 3 × 3 board. Different from standard Tic-Tac-Toe,
Fig. 1. An EGDL description of Krieg-Tictactoe.
each player can see her own marks, but not those of her opponent, just like the
chess variant Kriegspiel [17].
To represent the Krieg-Tictactoe, we first describe its game signature, writ-
ten SKT , as follows: NKT = {x,o} where x denotes the player who marks
the symbol cross and o denotes the player who marks the symbol naught;
ArKT = {ari,j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3}∪{noopr}, where ari,j denotes the action that player r
marks cell (i, j) with her symbol; ΦKT = {pri,j , tried(ari,j), turn(r) : r ∈ {x,o} and
1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3}, where pri,j represents the fact that cell (i, j) is marked with player
i’s symbol, tried(ari,j) represents the fact that player r has tried to mark cell (i, j)
but failed before, and turn(r) says that it is player r’s turn now. The rules of
Krieg-Tictactoe are specified by EGDL in Fig. 1 (where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, r ∈ {x, o}
and −r represents r’s opponent).
Rules 1–5 specify the initial state, each player’s winning states, the terminal
states and the turn-taking. In particular, Rule 2 specifies that if a player has
tried to mark a cell, then the corresponding cell is marked by the opponent.
The preconditions of each action (legality) are specified by 6 and 7. The
player who has the turn can mark any non-terminal cell such that (i) it is not
marked by herself, and (ii) she has never tried to mark it before. A player can
only do action noop at the terminal states or the states where it is not her turn.
Rules 8 and 9 are the combination of the frame axioms and the effect axioms.
Rule 8 states that a cell is marked with a player’s symbol in the next state if the
player takes the corresponding action at the current state or the cell has been
marked by her symbol before. Similarly, Rule 9 says that an action is tried by a
player in the next state if the action is ineffective while still taken by the player
at the current state, or this action has been tried before.
The rest of the rules specify the epistemic status of the game. Rule 10 states
each player knows which action she is taking. Rule 11 and Rule 12 say both
players know the initial state and their turns, respectively. Rule 13 says that
each player knows which cell is marked or not with her symbol. Similarly, Rule
14 states that each player knows which cell is tried or not by herself.
Note that rules 12–14 together specify the epistemic relations for each player:
two states are indistinguishable for a player if their configurations are the same
from her point of view. Finally, let ΣKT be the set of rules 1–14.
2.3 The Semantics
The semantics of EGDL-formulas is based on the epistemic state transition
models.
Definition 5. Let M be an EST-model. Given a path δ in M and a formula
ϕ ∈ L, we say ϕ is true at δ under M , denoted by M, δ |= ϕ, according to the
following definition:
M, δ |= p iff p ∈ π(δ[0])
M, δ |= ¬ϕ iff M, δ |= ϕ
M, δ |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, δ |= ϕ1 and M, δ |= ϕ2
M, δ |= initial iff δ[0] ∈ I
M, δ |= terminal iff δ[0] ∈ T
M, δ |= wins(r) iff δ[0] ∈ g(r)
M, δ |= legal(ar) iff (δ[0], ar) ∈ Lr
M, δ |= does(ar) iff θr(δ, 0) = ar
M, δ |= ©ϕ iff M, δ[1,∞] |= ϕ
M, δ |= Krϕ iff for any δ′ ∈ P, if δ ≈r δ′, then M, δ′ |= ϕ
M, δ |= Cϕ iff for any δ′ ∈ P, if δ ≈N δ′, then M, δ′ |= ϕ
where ≈N is the transitive closure of
⋃
r∈N ≈r.
A formula ϕ is globally true or valid in an EST-model M , written M |= ϕ, if
M, δ |= ϕ for any δ ∈ P. A formula ϕ is valid, written |= ϕ, if M |= ϕ for
any EST-model M . Let Σ be a set of formulas in L, then M is a model of Σ if
M |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Σ.
The following result specifies some generic game properties.
Proposition 1. For any r ∈ N , ϕ ∈ L and ar, br ∈ Ar,
1. |= ¬ © initial
2. |= terminal → ∧ar∈Ar\{noopr} ¬legal(ar) ∧ legal(noopr)
3. |= ∨ar∈Ar does(ar)
4. |= ¬(does(ar) ∧ does(br)) for ar = br
5. |= does(ar) → legal(ar)
6. |= ∨ar∈Ar legal(ar)
7. |= terminal ∧ ϕ → ©ϕ
The first formula says that a game would never go back to its initial state
once it starts. The second formula specifies that all players can only take action
“noop” at the terminal states. The third and forth formulas prescribe that there
is a unique action for each player at all game states. The fifth formula asserts
that any action that is taken should be legal. The sixth formula specifies that
each player has at least one legal action at each state. The last formula requires
that a terminal state leads to a self-loop.
Besides those generic game properties, EGDL is also able to specify epistemic
properties of a game. For instance, whether each player always knows her own
legal actions in the course of the game. This property as well as some other
well-known properties have been discussed in [14]. It is worth of mentioning that
although these properties are expressible in EGDL, different from the generic
game properties, they are not valid for any game model.
3 Axiomatization
In this section, we develop an axiomatic system for the logic EGDL, and provide
its soundness and completeness with respect to the epistemic state transition
models.
3.1 The Axiomatic System
EGDL consists of the following axiom schemas and inference rules: For any ar,
br ∈ Ar, r ∈ N and ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
– Axiom Schemas:
1. All tautologies of classical propositional logic.
2. ¬ © initial
3. terminal → ∧ar∈Ar\{noopr} ¬legal(ar) ∧ legal(noopr)
4.
∨
ar∈Ar does(a
r)
5. ¬(does(ar) ∧ does(br)) for ar = br.
6. ©(ϕ → ψ) → (©ϕ → ©ψ)
7. ¬ © ϕ ↔ ©¬ϕ
8. does(ar) → legal(ar)
9. ϕ ∧ terminal → ©ϕ
10. Kr(ϕ → ψ) → (Krϕ → Krψ)
11. Krϕ → ϕ
12. Krϕ → KrKrϕ
13. ¬Krϕ → Kr¬Krϕ
14. Eϕ ↔ ∧mr=1 Krϕ
15. Cϕ → E(ϕ ∧ Cϕ)
– Inference Rules:
(R1) From ϕ, ϕ → ψ infer ψ.
(R2) From ϕ infer ©ϕ.
(R3) From ϕ infer Krϕ.
(R4) From ϕ → E(ϕ ∧ ψ) infer ϕ → Cψ.
Besides the axioms mentioned in Proposition 1, the axioms for temporal and
epistemic operators are well-known. Note that since we focus on games with
imperfect recall, thus there is no interaction properties between epistemic and
temporal operators. Let  denote the provability in EGDL. The notion of the
syntactic consequence (derivation) is defined in the standard way.
With the proof theory, we are now able to derive the following formulas from
the rules of Krieg-Tictactoe specified in Fig. 1.
Proposition 2. For any r ∈ NKT and ari,j ∈ ArKT ,
1. ΣKT initial → Cinitial
2. ΣKT legal(ari,j) → Kr(legal(ari,j))
3. ΣKT does(ari,j) → ©Kr(pri,j ∨ tried(ari,j))
4. ΣKT Krtried(ari,j) → Krp−ri,j
That is, in Krieg-Tictactoe, the turn-taking is common knowledge (Clause 1).
Each player knows her own available actions (Clause 2). If an agent marks a
cell at the current state, then she will knows either this cell has been marked or
been tried by herself at the next state (Clause 3). Moreover, if a player knows
that she has tried to mark a cell, then she knows the corresponding cell has been
marked by the opponent (Clause 4).
3.2 Completeness Proofs
The completeness result is achieved in two step. First, we construct a pre-model
for a consistent formula ϕ out of consistent subsets of a finite set of formulas,
called the closure of ϕ. The construction resembles those previously used for
completeness of propositional dynamic logic [15] and epistemic temporal logics
[7]. Next we transform the pre-model into an epistemic state transition model
and show that the satisfiability of EGDL-formulas is invariant under such trans-
formation. This idea is captured in Figure 2 (where r ∈ N and k ∈ N).
Let us now fix a formula ϕ ∈ L, which is consistent in EGDL, i.e., not
 ¬ϕ. We define ad(ϕ) to be the greatest number of alternations of distinct
Kr’s along any branch in ϕ’s parse tree. If ϕ involves the common knowledge
operator C, let ad(ϕ) = 0. For instance, ad(Kr1Kr2Kr1p) = 3; ad(Kr1Kr1Kr2p) =
2; ad(CKr1Kr2p) = 0; temporal operators are not considered, so that ad(Kr1Kr2©
Kr1p) = 3.
A finite sequence σ = r1r2 · · · rk of agents, possibly equal to the null sequence
, is called an index if ri = ri+1 for all i < k. We write |σ| for the length k of
such a sequence. In particular, || = 0.
Let N∗ be the set of all finite sequences over N , we define the absorptive
concatenation function # from N∗ × N to N∗ as follows: Given a sequence
σ ∈ N∗ and an agent r ∈ N ,
σ#r =
{
σ if the final element ofσis r;
σr otherwise.
Given ϕ ∈ L, for each k ≥ 0, we define the k-closure clk(ϕ), and for each
agent r ∈ N , we define the k, r-closure clk,r(ϕ). The definitions of these sets
proceeds by mutual recursion:
Fig. 2. The roadmap of the completeness proof for EGDL. Note that solid arrows
denote the process to achieve the completeness, and dashed arrows denote the notions
and their properties to obtain the intermediate results. The abbreviation “MCS”
denotes the maximal consistent set.
1. The basic closure cl0(ϕ) is the smallest set containing ϕ such that
(a) it is closed under subformulas.
(b) if Eψ ∈ cl0(ϕ), then Kr1ψ, · · · ,Krmψ ∈ cl0(ϕ).
(c) if Cψ ∈ cl0(ϕ), then ECψ ∈ cl0(ϕ).
(d) if ψ ∈ cl0(ϕ) and ψ is not of the form ¬ψ′, then ¬ψ ∈ cl0(ϕ).
2. Let clk,r(ϕ) be the union of clk(ϕ) with the set of formulas of the form Kr(ψ1∨
· · ·ψn) or ¬Kr(ψ1 ∨ · · ·ψn), where the ψi are distinct formulas in clk(ϕ).
3. clk+1(ϕ) =
⋃m
r=1 clk,r(ϕ).
If X is a finite set of formulas, we write φX for the conjunction of all the for-
mulas in X. A finite set X of formulas is said to be consistent if φX is consistent.
A finite set Cl of formulas is said to be negation-closed if, for all ψ ∈ Cl, either
¬ψ ∈ Cl or ψ is of the form ¬ψ′ and ψ′ ∈ Cl. Note that the sets clk(ϕ) and
clk,r(ϕ) are negation-closed. We define an atom of Cl to be a maximal consistent
subset of Cl. The set of all atoms of Cl is denoted as ACl. We have the following
properties.
Proposition 3. Suppose that X is a finite set of formulas and Cl is a negation-
closed set of formulas. For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L,
1. if  φX → ϕ1 and  ϕ1 → ϕ2, then  φX → ϕ2.
2. if X is an atom of Cl and ψ ∈ Cl, then either  φX → ψ or  φX → ¬ψ.
3.  ∨X∈ACl φX .
The construction of the pre-model of ϕ is based on the atoms of the closures
of ϕ. Let d = ad(ϕ).
Definition 6. The pre-model of ϕ, denoted by Mϕ = (Wϕ, Iϕ, Tϕ, {Rϕr }r∈N ,
{Lϕr }r∈N , Uϕ, gϕ, πϕ), is constructed as follows:
1. Wϕ consists of all the pairs (σ,X) such that σ is an index, |σ| ≤ d, and
(a) if σ =  then X is an atom of cld(ϕ), and
(b) if σ = τr then X is an atom of clk,r(ϕ), where k = d − |σ|.
2. Iϕ = {(σ,X) ∈ Wϕ :  φX → initial}.
3. Tϕ = {(σ,X) ∈ Wϕ :  φX → terminal}.
4. (σ,X)Rϕr (τ, Y ) iff σ#r = τ#r and {ψ : Krψ ∈ X} = {χ : Krχ ∈ Y }.
5. ((σ,X), ar) ∈ Lϕr iff  φX → legal(ar).
6. Uϕ((σ,X), d) = (τ, Y ) iff  φX →
∧
r∈N legal(d(r)), σ = τ and the formula
φX ∧ ©φY is consistent.
7. gϕ(r) = {(σ,X) ∈ Wϕ :  φX → wins(r)}.
8. πϕ((σ,X)) = {p ∈ Φ :  φX → p}.
It is easy to see that the update function in Mϕ is non-deterministic, and thus
Mϕ is not an EST-model. We redefine the notion of a path as follows:
Definition 7. Given the pre-model Mϕ = (Wϕ, Iϕ, Tϕ, {Rϕr }r∈N , {Lϕr }r∈N ,
Uϕ, gϕ, πϕ) of ϕ, a path δ of Mϕ is an infinite sequence of states and actions
w0
d1→ w1 d2→ · · · such that the conditions are the same as those in Definition 2
except changing Condition 1 to wj ∈ Uϕ(wj−1, dj) due to nondeterminacy.
Similarly, we generalize the indistinguishable relation to the paths. We say that
two paths δ, δ′ of Mϕ are indistinguishable for agent r, denoted by δ ≈ϕr δ′, iff
δ[0]Rϕr δ
′[0]. The truth conditions for all EGDL-formulas under the pre-model
are exactly the same as those in Definition 5. In particular, we use Mϕ, δ |=∗ ϕ
to denote that ϕ is true at path δ under Mϕ.
If w = (σ,X) is a state, we define φw to be the formula φX . Following [7],
we say that the state w directly decides a formula ψ if either ψ ∈ w, ¬ψ ∈ w,
or ψ = ¬ψ′ and ψ′ ∈ w. We say that w decides ψ if either  φw → ψ, or
 φw → ¬ψ. Clearly, if w directly decides ψ, then w decides ψ. Note that
if σ = τr, then each σ-state directly decides every formula in clk,r(ϕ). Also,
every -state directly decides every formula in cld(ϕ). In particular, we have the
following results about formulas with K-operators.
Proposition 4. Given two states w = (σ,X) and u = (τ, Y ), if σ#r = τ#r,
then the same formulas of the form Krψ are directly decided by w and u.
Given a σ-state w, we use Φw,r for the disjunction of all the formulas φu,
where u is a σ-state satisfying wRϕr u, and we use Φ
+
w,r for the disjunction of all
the formulas φu, where u is a σ#r-state satisfying wRϕr u.
Proposition 5. 1. If w is a σ-state and u is a σ-state or σ#r-state such that
not wRϕr u, then  φw → Kr¬φu.
2. For all σ-states w,  φw → KrΦw,r.
3. For all σ-states w, if |σ#r| ≤ d, then  φw → KrΦ+w,r.
The following two propositions show that the pre-model has properties resem-
bling those for the truth conditions for formulas in the basic closure.
Proposition 6. For all σ-statesw and Krψ ∈ cl0(ϕ), the following are equivalent.
1.  φw → ¬Krψ.
2. There is some σ-state u such that wRϕr u and  φu → ¬ψ.
Please recall that when the formula ϕ contains the common knowledge oper-
ator, we take d = 0, so that all states are -states.
Proposition 7. Given Cψ ∈ cl0(ϕ), the following are equivalent.
1.  φw → ¬Cψ
2. there is a state u reachable from w through the relation Rϕr such that  φu → ¬ψ.
The next definition specifies how to extend a σ-state for ϕ to a path in the
pre-model.
Definition 8. Given an arbitrary σ-state w, we define a sequence δw of states
and actions w0
d1→ w1 d2→ · · · as follows: for any r ∈ N and j ≥ 1,
1. wj is a σ-state in Wϕ, and dj ∈ D.
2. w0 = w.
3. φwj−1 ∧ ©φwj is consistent.
4. dj(r) = arj iff  φwj−1 → does(arj).
The following result shows such generated sequence is indeed a path of Mϕ.
Proposition 8. Given an arbitrary σ-state w, the sequence δw is a path of Mϕ.
Proof. We first show that δw is infinite. Suppose not that there is some state
wl with no successor. By Axiom 4 and Axiom 5, such an action arj for each
agent always exists. Then it is only the case that  φwl → ¬ © φs for all
atoms s of clk,r(ϕ) where k = d − |σ| if σ = τr, or cld(ϕ) if σ = . But by
Proposition 3.3 and (R2) we have  ©∨X∈Aclk,r(ϕ) φX where k = d − |σ| if σ =
τr;  ©∨X∈Acld(ϕ) φX if σ = , which contradicts that wl is consistent. With
this, it remains to show that δw satisfies the conditions of a path in Definition 7.
Condition 1 holds directly by the definition of Uϕ and Axiom 8. Regarding
Condition 2, by Clause 3 and Axiom 8, we have  φwj−1 → legal(dj(r)) for
any r ∈ N and j ≥ 1, so dj(r) ∈ Lϕr (wj−1). Regarding Condition 3, assume
wl−1 ∈ Tϕ and wl−1 = wl for some l ≥ 1. Without loss of generalization, say
wl−1 = (σ,Xl−1) and wl = (σ,Xl). Then  φXl−1 → terminal, and there is some
α ∈ clk,r(ϕ) where k = d − |σ| if σ = τr, or α ∈ cld(ϕ) if σ = , such that either
(α ∈ Xl−1 and α ∈ Xl) or (α ∈ Xl−1 and α ∈ Xl). By symmetry, it suffices
to show the case α ∈ Xl−1 and α ∈ Xl. Then  φXl−1 → ¬α and  φXl → α.
From the former and by Axiom 9, we get  φXl−1 → ©¬α, so  φXl−1 → ¬©α
by Axiom 7. While from  φXl → α and by (R2),  ©φXl → ©α, which
contradicts that φXl−1 ∧ ©φXl is consistent. Thus, for all j ≥ 1, if wj−1 ∈ Tϕ,
then wj−1 = wj . This completes the proof. ()
We now come to one of the main intermediate results.
Lemma 1. For every α ∈ cl0(ϕ) and every -state w,
Mϕ, δw |=∗ α iff  φw → α.
It is routine to prove this by induction on the complexity of α. As we noted
before, the pre-model Mϕ of ϕ is not an EST-model. To achieve the completeness
result of EGDL, it suffices to transform the pre-model of φ into a deterministic
model with an equivalent satisfiability. Inspired by [18], we redefine states as a
subset of atoms and treat all the successors as a single state in the new model.
The transformation is given as follows:
Definition 9. Let Mϕ = (Wϕ, Iϕ, Tϕ, {Rϕr }r∈N , {Lϕr }r∈N , Uϕ, gϕ, πϕ) be the
pre-model of ϕ. Then A(Mϕ) is a model (S, I, T, {Rr}r∈N , {Lr}r∈N , U, g, π)
based on Mϕ such that
1. S consists of all the pairs (σ, Γ ) such that σ is an index, |σ| ≤ d, and
(a) if σ =  then Γ is a non-empty subset of Acld(ϕ), and
(b) if σ = τr then Γ is a non-empty subset of Aclk,r(ϕ), where k = d − |σ|.
2. I = {(σ, Γ ) ∈ S : Γ ⊆ {X : (σ,X) ∈ Iϕ}}.
3. T = {(σ, Γ ) ∈ S : Γ ⊆ {X : (σ,X) ∈ Tϕ}}.
4. (σ, Γ )Rr(τ,Δ) iff σ#r = τ#r and {ψ : Krψ ∈
⋃
Γ} = {χ : Krχ ∈
⋃
Δ}.
5. Lr((σ, Γ )) =
⋃
X∈Γ L
ϕ
r ((σ,X)).
6. U((σ, Γ ), d) = (σ,Δ) where Δ = {Y : (σ, Y ) ∈ ⋃X∈Γ Uϕ((σ,X), d)}.
7. g(r) = {(σ, Γ ) ∈ S : Γ ⊆ {X : (σ,X) ∈ gϕ(r)}}.
8. π((σ, Γ )) =
⋃
X∈Γ π
ϕ((σ,X)).
The following result shows the associated model A(Mϕ) is just what we want.
Proposition 9. Given a pre-model Mϕ of ϕ, the model A(Mϕ) is an EST-
model.
Proof. Clearly, S = ∅ and I ∩ T = ∅ follows from  ¬(initial ∧ terminal). It
is straightforward that the epistemic relation Rr is equivalent. Regarding Lr,
for any (σ, Γ ) ∈ S, since Γ = ∅ and Lϕr ((σ,X)) = ∅ for any (σ,X) ∈ Wϕ,
so by definition Lr((σ, Γ )) = ∅ (Condition (i)). Assume (σ, Γ ) ∈ T , then by
the definition we have (σ,X) ∈ Tϕ for any X ∈ Γ , so  φX → terminal.
And by Axiom 3, we have  φX →
∧
ar∈Ar\{noopr} ¬legal(ar) ∧ legal(noopr), so
Lϕr ((σ,X)) = {noopr} for any X ∈ Γ . Thus, Lr((σ, Γ )) = {noopr} (Condition
(ii)). It remains to show that the update function U satisfies the assumption.
We first show that for any state (σ, Γ ) ∈ S and joint action d ∈ D,
U((σ, Γ ), d) is non-initial. This follows from the fact that for any d ∈ D and
(σ,X) ∈ Wϕ, Uϕ((σ,X), d) ∩ Iϕ = ∅ (by Axiom 2).
We next show that U((σ, Γ ), d) is unique if exists. Suppose not, then there
are (σ,Δ) and (σ,Δ′) such that U((σ, Γ ), d) = (σ,Δ), U((σ, Γ ), d) = (σ,Δ′)
and Δ = Δ′. But by the definition we have Δ = Δ′ = {Y : (σ, Y ) ∈⋃
X∈Γ U
ϕ((σ,X), d)}: a contradiction. Thus, U(s, d) is unique.
The last assumption follows from the
fact that for any (σ,X) ∈ Tϕ, Uϕ((σ,X), 〈noopr〉r∈N ) = (σ,X). This is
proved by a similar method of Proposition 8. ()
To complete the transformation, we next show how to generate a path in
A(Mϕ) from a given path in the pre-model Mϕ of ϕ.
Definition 10. Let Mϕ be the pre-model of ϕ. For any path δ := (σ,X0)
d1→
(σ,X1)
d2→ · · · of Mϕ, we define a sequence of states and joint actions δ̂ :=
(τ, Γ0)
d′1→ (τ, Γ1) d
′
2→ · · · with respect to δ as follows: for any j ≥ 1,
1. σ = τ and dj = d′j,
2. Γ0 = {X0}, and
3. Γj = {Xj : (σ,Xj) ∈
⋃
Xj−1∈Γj−1 U
ϕ((σ,Xj−1), dj)}.
Proposition 10. For any path δ of Mϕ, the sequence δ̂ is a path of A(Mϕ).
Proof. Let δ := (σ,X0)
d1→ (σ,X1) d2→ · · · and δ̂ := (τ, Γ0) d1→ (τ, Γ1) d2→ · · · .
Clearly, δ̂ is infinite as δ is infinite. It suffices to show that δ̂ satisfies all the
conditions of a path in Definition 2. Let us first consider Condition 1. Suppose
not that there is some k ≥ 1 such that δ̂[k] ∈ I, then by the definition of
A(Mϕ), we have for all (σ,X) ∈ δ̂[k], (σ,X) ∈ Iϕ. In particular, (σ,Xk) ∈ Iϕ,
so  Xk → initial. Then by (R2) we have  ©Xk → ©initial. But by Axiom 2
we have  Xk−1 → ¬ © initial, contradicting that the formula Xk−1 ∧ ©Xk is
consistent. Thus, δ̂[j] ∈ I for all j ≥ 1. Condition 2 holds directly by the last two
clauses of Definition 10. Regarding Condition 3, for any r ∈ N , we have dj(r) ∈
Lϕr ((σ,Xj−1)) by Definition 7. Since Xj−1 ∈ Γj−1, so we have Lϕr ((σ,Xj−1)) ⊆
Lr((σ, Γj−1)) by Definition 9. Thus, dj(r) ∈ Lr((σ, Γj−1)). Regarding Condition
4, it suffices to show the following fact that for any (σ,X) ∈ Tϕ and d ∈ D,
Uϕ((σ,X), d) =
{{(σ,X)} if d = 〈noopr〉r∈N ;
∅ otherwise.
By Axiom 3,  φX →
∧
r∈N (
∧
ar∈Ar\{noopr} ¬legal(ar) ∧ legal(noopr)). And
by Axiom 8, we have  φX →
∧
r∈N (
∧
ar∈Ar\{noopr} ¬does(ar)). Thus,
Uϕ((σ,X), d) = ∅ for any d = 〈noopr〉r∈N . Then by Axiom 4, we have
 φX →
∧
r∈N does(noop
r). Since φX ∧ ©φX is consistent, so (σ,X) ∈
Uϕ((σ,X), 〈noopr〉r∈N ). Suppose there is another state (τ, Y ) ∈ Wϕ such that
(τ, Y ) ∈ Uϕ((σ,X), 〈noopr〉r∈N ) and (σ,X) = (τ, Y ). Then there is some
α ∈ clk,r(ϕ) where k = d − |σ| if σ = τr, or α ∈ cld(ϕ) if σ = , such that either
(α ∈ X and α ∈ Y ) or (α ∈ X and α ∈ Y ). By symmetry, it suffices to show
the case α ∈ X and α ∈ Y . Then  φX → terminal ∧ α. And by Axiom 9, we
get  φX → ©α. By Proposition 3.2, we have either  φY → α or  φY → ¬α.
The former contradicts with the assumption α ∈ Y . Thus,  φY → ¬α. Then
by (R2), we have  ©(φY → ¬α), so  ©φY → ¬ © α, contradicting that
φX ∧ ©φY is consistent. Thus, Uϕ((σ,X), 〈noopr〉r∈N ) = {(σ,X)}. For any
(σ, Γj−1) ∈ T , by the definition we have (σ,X) ∈ Tϕ for any X ∈ Γj−1, then by
the fact for any X ∈ Γj−1, Uϕ((σ,X), dj) = {(σ,X)} and dj = 〈noopr〉r∈N , so
{Xj : (σ,Xj) ∈
⋃
X∈Γj−1 U
ϕ((σ,X), 〈noopr〉r∈N )} = Γj−1. Thus, Γj = Γj−1.
This completes the proof of the proposition. ()
Then we have the following equivalent result in terms of the transformations.
Lemma 2. Let Mϕ be the pre-model of ϕ and δ be a path of Mϕ. Then for any
α ∈ L,
Mϕ, δ |= ∗α iff A(Mϕ), δ̂ |= α.
We are now in the position to prove the soundness and completeness results
of EGDL with respect to the epistemic state transition models.
Theorem 1. The logic EGDL is sound and complete with respect to the class
of epistemic state transition models, i.e., for every ϕ ∈ L, |= ϕ iff  ϕ.
Proof. We only show the completeness. Assume  ϕ, then ¬ϕ is consistent, so
there is an -state w such that  φw → ¬ϕ. By Lemma 1, M¬ϕ, δw |= ∗¬ϕ.
And by Lemma2, we have A(M¬ϕ), δ̂w |= ¬ϕ. Thus,  |= ϕ. This completes the
proof. ()
Then we have the following result saying that EGDL has the finite model
property.
Theorem 2. Let ϕ be a formula in EGDL. If ϕ is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable
in a finite epistemic state transition model.
4 Related Work
To deal with imperfect information games, many logics, mostly epistemic exten-
sions of Alternating-time Temporal Logic, Strategy Logic and PDL, have been
developed [1,2,10–13]. Different from them, as shown in [14], EGDL uses a
bottom-up approach in order to create a balance between expressive power and
computational efficiency. It is a conservative extension of a simple and practi-
cal logical language GDL. Besides the literature discussed in Introduction, the
following is also worth mentioning.
Zhang and Thielscher propose a dynamic extension of GDL for reasoning
about game strategies, and develop a sound and complete axiomatic system
for this logic [24]. With different languages and semantics, their axiomatization
and techniques to prove the completeness are different from ours. In particular,
they make use of forgetting techniques while we combine techniques used for
completeness of PDL and ETLs.
As a logic programming language, GDL has recently been extended to GDL-
II and GDL-III so as to incorporate imperfect information games [22,23]. They
are different from EGDL in two aspects: (i) GDL-II and GDL-III are purely
logic programming languages and do not provide a reasoning facility to reason
about epistemic game rules. While as a logic EGDL is able to represent and
reason about rules of imperfect information. Moreover, we have developed an
axiomatic system for EGDL. (ii) GDL-II and GDL-III considers games with
perfect recall players and randomness, such as dice rolling and card shuffling.
While EGDL focuses on imperfect recall games without randomness. Yet EGDL
is flexible enough to specify perfect recall as well as the state-based memory and
the action-based memory [4].
Finally, it is worth mentioning that EGDL has similarities with ETLs such
as CKLm [7], but they are significantly different in the following ways: (i) With
does(.) operator, EGDL can express actions and their effects, thus it can be used
for reasoning about actions, while epistemic temporal logics are not. Moreover,
with action operator, the completeness proof of EGDL is different from those
of epistemic temporal logics; (ii) EGDL contains a single temporal operator
(“next”), and can only represent finite steps of time. (iii) Model checking for
EGDL is in Δp2, while, for epistemic temporal logics, it is at least PSPACE-
hard [21].
5 Conclusion
We have developed a sound and complete axiomatic system for a variant of
EGDL. From the completeness proof, we have derived the finite model property
of this logic. We have also demonstrated how to use the proof theory for inferring
game properties from game rules.
Directions of future research are manifold. We intend to investigate the satis-
fiability problem of EGDL. The hardness of the satisfiability problem for EGDL
follows from the fact that EGDL is a conservative extension of S5Cn , and the
satisfiability problem for S5Cn is EXPTIME-complete [8]. We also want to study
the definability problem of EGDL [3]: which properties of games are definable by
means of EGDL-formulas? For instance, this paper shows that EGDL is able to
provide a description for Krieg-Tictactoe. It would be interesting to consider the
other direction: whether Krieg-Tictactoe is completely or even uniquely specified
by such a description.
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